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WHOSE FAULT?—DAUBERT, THE NAS REPORT, 
AND THE NOTION OF ERROR IN FORENSIC 
SCIENCE 
D. Michael Risinger∗ 
“Handwriting is even more precise  
than DNA evidence for identification 
purposes.”1 
 
The notion of “error” and “error rates” is central both to the Daubert 
opinion2 and to the recent NAS Report on the strengths and weaknesses of 
forensic science in the United States.3  As might be expected, the NAS Re-
 
∗ John J. Gibbons Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.  My thanks to 
Lesley C. Risinger for her usual indispensible aid, editorial and substantive. 
 1. Detective Chris White, testifying at trial as handwriting expert in Florence v. Com-
monwealth, 120 S.W.3d 699, 701 (Ky. 2003). 
 2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 3. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 
(2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT].  How to refer to this report has become something of a 
vexing problem.  The report is a report of the Committee on Identifying the Needs of the 
Forensic Science Community, which is identified on the title page as a Committee of the 
National Research Council (NRC) (a joint endeavor of the National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS), the National Academy of Engineering (NAE) and the Institute of Medicine).  See id. 
at iii.  In addition, the title page suggests some formal conjunction with both the NRC 
Committee on Science, Technology and Law, Policy and Global Affairs, and the NRC 
Committee on Applied and Theoretical Statistics.  Proper characterization of the report is 
complicated by the fact that the NRC and the NAE are merely administrative subdivisions 
of an organization whose name under its charter is simply the National Academy of 
Sciences.  (The NRC was created as a subdivision of the NAS in 1916, and the NAE in 1964 
and the Institute of Medicine in 1970. See id. at v.)  Things are further complicated by the 
fact that when the NAS created the National Academy of Engineering, it retained the desig-
nation “National Academy of Sciences” for the non-engineering members of the academy, 
and after the most recent subdivisions, it rebranded itself with the umbrella appellation “The 
National Academies,” without amending its charter, so that it is formally the National Acad-
emy of Sciences d/b/a “The National Academies.” See History of the National Academies, 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/history.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2010). 
  Be all these things as they may, the body of the Report makes clear that the Commit-
tee was the result of a 2006 congressional charge to the National Academy of Sciences, that 
the Committee was formed in response to that charge to the NAS, and that the Report is the 
work primarily of that Committee. NAS REPORT, supra, at 1-2.  It has become most com-
mon to refer to the Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community 
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port does a better job of explaining the kinds of error it is concerned with 
than did the opinion in Daubert.  However, both to a greater or lesser de-
gree fall short of a full consideration of the concept of error, and so doing, 
they invite confusion about how inaccurate results in criminal adjudication 
may occur, and who if anyone is to blame. 
When I set out to write on this state of affairs, I was not particularly sur-
prised by it.  Courts at all levels are at times notoriously imprecise about 
important concepts, and the NAS Committee that generated the report was 
operating in a setting and in a tradition where the notion of error seemed to 
them, perhaps wrongly, to be intuitively obvious.  What I was surprised 
about when I looked into the matter was that this unexamined approach to 
the concept of error prevailed in the very discipline where one would ex-
pect it to have been carefully taxonomized and theorized to a fare-thee-well 
in at least a dozen different ways, that is, philosophy in general and episte-
mology in particular.  Nor is this condition any great secret within the phi-
losophical literature.4  It has been repeatedly noted as a glaring lacuna for 
 
simply as the “NAS Committee” and the report as the “NAS Committee Report,” or simply 
the “NAS Report,” although in some circles the Committee is referred to as the “NRC 
Committee,” and the report the “NRC Report.”  In two previous articles, which were essen-
tially companion pieces, I referred to the report as the “NAS/NRC Report” to satisfy the edi-
tors of the first piece, who had adopted the convention “NRC Report” for that journal (JU-
RIMETRICS). See D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Glass 
Nine-Tenths Full (This Is About the Other Tenth), 50 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (2009) [hereinafter 
Risinger, A Glass Nine-Tenths Full]; D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Foren-
sic Science: A Path Forward Fraught with Pitfalls, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 225 [hereinafter Ri-
singer, A Path Forward Fraught with Pitfalls].  In the current article I have adopted what I 
believe has now become by far the most common convention, referring to the Committee 
simply as the “NAS Committee,” and the report as the “NAS Report.” 
 4. Lest the reader believe that I have failed to exercise due diligence in making so bold 
a claim, my research strategy on the issue was as follows.  I first looked at every article with 
the word “error” in the title in the JSTOR philosophy database (126 articles over a period of 
117 years).  I read the thirty or so articles that seemed most promising, and the ones that 
were in fact germane are cited herein. I looked at every title in the Library of Congress with 
the word “error” in it (2226 books and other items).  Surprisingly few looked promising at 
all (there were a lot of fiction books and videos, for instance).  Less than half a dozen ap-
peared to be relevant.  A couple of relevant items had been reviewed in the New York Times 
book review and I had noted them at the time.  The resulting list was not very different from 
that assembled by Kathryn Schulz in KATHRYN SCHULZ, BEING WRONG: ADVENTURES IN THE 
MARGINS OF ERROR (2010), and included DAVID W. BATES, ENLIGHTENMENT ABERRATIONS: 
ERROR & REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (2002); ROBERT A. BURTON, ON BEING IN CERTAIN:  BE-
LIEVING YOU ARE RIGHT WHEN YOU ARE NOT (2008); LEO W. KELLER, THE PROBLEM OF ER-
ROR FROM PLATO TO KANT (1934); JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR (1990); and HAMARTIA: 
THE CONCEPT OF ERROR IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (Donald V. Stump et al. eds., 1983).  I 
also familiarized myself with the classical sources referenced in these works.  While this 
search strategy did not guarantee that I had discovered every source discussing the concept 
of error, I believe that it was sufficient for me to be reasonably confident that nothing noto-
riously ambitious or successful escaped, and that the quotations given in the following foot-
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well over a century.5  However, very little appears to have been done about 
it.6 
 
note reflecting the evaluations by professional philosophers interested in the subject across 
more than a century are essentially reflective of a continuing consensus. 
 5.  
I wish now to consider, the elementary question whether an idea, which is one ex-
istence, can know an object, which is another; or, as I shall put it, what we mean 
by true opinion and false, by knowledge and error.  The difficulty that waits to 
thwart us here is among the deepest difficulties in thought.  I am not unaware of 
the literature existing on this subject, from the Greeks through Fichte, Hegel and 
their followers, to certain writers of the present day, though from some points of 
view it seems to me surprisingly slight. 
Dickenson Sergeant Miller, The Meaning of Truth and Error, 2 PHIL. REV. 408, 409 (1893).  
“Our philosophic predecessors give little help.  For though they have usually been eager to 
point out the errors of their predecessors they have reflected little upon the nature of Error in 
general, and the little they have contributed to the subject has often been of negative value.” 
F. C. S. Schiller, Error, 11 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, NEW SERIES, 144, 
145 (1910-1911). 
In ten successive chapters, Father Keeler searches for a doctrine of error in the 
works of the pre-Socratics and Plato, Aristotle, the Skeptic, Stoic, and Epicurean 
schools, Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus and the Spanish Scholastics, Descartes, Spi-
noza, the British philosophers, and Kant.  He is convinced that a history of the 
problem of error is of crucial significance to epistemology, since ‘a theory of 
knowledge, to be acceptable, must necessarily make room for a complementary 
theory of error’ (p. ix).  Yet he finds that the fact of error raised an important phi-
losophic problem for only three of the great philosophers, Plato, St. Augustine, 
and Descartes, and even these three failed to formulate an epistemology adequate 
to account for error. 
R. McK., reviewing LEO W. KEELER, THE PROBLEM OF ERROR FROM PLATO TO KANT, A HIS-
TORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY, 31 J. PHIL. 535, 535 (1934). 
Throughout the history of philosophy there has been a sustained interest in the 
concepts of knowledge, truth and meaning; interest in the concepts of error, falsity 
and nonsense, on the other hand, has been intermittent and spasmodic.  Error, for 
example, has suffered at the expense of knowledge to such an extent that some-
times its very existence has been denied, or it has been explained away as being 
merely the absence of or privation of knowledge; many theories of truth are so 
constructed that no place can be found for falsity, and theories about what consti-
tutes making sense pay, on the whole, little heed to what constitutes nonsense. 
J. L. Evans, Error and the Will, 38 PHILOSOPHY 144, 144 (1963). 
“The problem of error is one of philosophy’s very serious and crucial problems.”  
Alexander Koyre made this remark in a footnote.  It epitomizes the state of the 
problem of error: The problem is “very serious and crucial,” yet the treatments it 
has received have generally been scanty and peripheral, that is, metaphorically 
they might amount to a footnote. 
Giora Hon, Going Wrong: To Make a Mistake, To Fall Into an Error, 49 REV. METAPHYSICS 
3, 5 (1995). 
 6. On the other hand, the psychology literature dealing with error from a scientific 
perspective actually contains some robust taxonomic systems for the classification of error, 
at least error of the sort that will concern us in this paper.  See generally REASON, supra note 
4, at 1-61, for both the history of these efforts and their modern characteristics. 
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Needless to say, I will not be attempting a full-scale examination of the 
concept of error in this paper. However, I believe there are some observa-
tions that can be made that may be helpful in domesticating in helpful ways 
the notion of error as it might apply to forensic science expertise.  Error in 
relation to forensic science presents fewer difficulties than a fully genera-
lized treatment, because there are certain problems necessarily taken on by 
a full scale philosophic treatment that can be safely put aside.  The issues of 
radical skepticism and the very possibilities of knowledge and error can be 
properly assumed away, for instance, because the givens of the law as a 
practical enterprise resolve those for the purposes of the law.7 And the dif-
 
 7. Professor Twining summarizes these foundational assumptions of system of legal 
proof thus: 
1.Knowledge about particular past events is possible. 
2.Establishing the truth about particular past events in issue in a case (the facts in 
issue) is a necessary condition for achieving justice in adjudication; incorrect re-
sults are one form of injustice. 
3.The notions of evidence and proof in adjudication are concerned with rational 
methods of determining questions of fact, in this context operative distinctions 
have to be maintained between questions of fact and questions of law, questions of 
fact and questions of value, and questions of fact and questions of opinion. 
4.The establishment of the truth of alleged facts in adjudication is typically a mat-
ter of probabilities, falling short of absolute certainty. 
5.(a) Judgments about the probabilities of allegations about particular past events 
can and should be reached by reasoning from relevant evidence presented to the 
decision-maker.  (b) The characteristic mode of reasoning about probabilities is 
induction. 
6.Judgments about probabilities have, generally speaking, to be based on the 
available stock of knowledge about the common course of events; this is largely a 
matter of common sense supplemented by specialized scientific or expert know-
ledge when it is available. 
7.The pursuit of truth (i.e. seeking to maximize the accuracy in fact determination) 
is to be given a high, but not necessarily overriding, priority in relation to other 
values, such as the security of the state, the protection of family relationships, or 
the curbing of coercive methods of interrogation. 
8.One crucial basis for evaluating “fact finding” institutions, rules, procedures and 
techniques is how far they are estimated to maximize accuracy in fact-
determination—but other criteria such as speed, cheapness, procedural fairness, 
humaneness, public confidence and the avoidance of vexation for participants are 
also to be taken into account. 
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ficult issue of normative error can also be sidestepped,8 because forensic 
science explicitly deals only with conclusions about empirical facts. 
However, limiting ourselves to the notion of factual error still leaves 
plenty to do. To begin at the beginning, such error can only exist as a func-
tion of the human mind.  There can be no error except in regard to a belief 
or action that is judged at a later time by some human agent to have been 
wrong in some respect, by some invoked criterion.  A mouse’s stillbirth is 
not an error, merely an event (although it may be referred to in anthropo-
morphic metaphor, and somewhat misleadingly, as an “error of nature”).  
Independent of sentient belief, purpose or action, there is no error in the 
natural world.  Whatever happens simply is.  For our purposes, only hu-
mans can make errors, or be in error.9 
There are in fact two different fundamental approaches to the concept of 
error which are important to consider, and which are significantly in ten-
sion with each other.10  We may label them the normative idea of error and, 
for want of a better term, the objective idea of error.  Failing to separate the 
two can lead to various confusions and troubles. 
Although in the end it is not really important which is taken as primary, I 
regard the normative notion as foundational both in normal usage and in 
underlying psychology.  In this most fundamental sense, an assertion of er-
 
9.The primary role of applied forensic psychology and forensic science is to pro-
vide guidance about the reliability of different kinds of evidence, and to develop 
methods and devices for increasing such reliability. 
WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 73 (1990). 
 8. The most fully developed consideration of normative error (that is, error about a 
value judgment), what it might be, and whether it is even a coherent concept, is to be found 
in the substantial literature on “moral error.”  For current purposes, the best reference is 
simply the instruction: “insert the term ‘moral error’ into any search engine and see what 
results.”  Note that, as we shall see, bypassing examination of the concept of normative error 
in this paper does not prevent us from considering normative theories of factual error. 
 9. See the discussion in REASON, supra note 4, at 5-10.  We need not pursue the ques-
tion of the extent to which other animals, or beings yet unknown, are sufficiently sentient to 
be said to make errors in the strict sense we are using.  For legal purposes we properly re-
strict ourselves to humans. 
 10. There is at least one other current attempt to identify inconsistent accounts of the 
phenomenon of error that are in tension with each other.  In a recent popular book on the 
subject, journalist Kathryn Schulz suggests there are two ways of looking at error, the first 
of which considers error to be bad, and the second of which considers that error has positive 
aspects as a way station on the journey to more secure knowledge. See SCHULZ, Two Models 
of Wrongness, in BEING WRONG: ADVENTURES IN THE MARGINS OF ERROR, supra note 4, at 
25-43.  This book is well researched and has some interesting things to say, but it is under-
mined by the author’s failure to police her assertions for consistency and her penchant for 
selecting the most dramatic way of asserting her positions over alternatives that might have 
been more nuanced. 
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ror entails a claim or charge of both mistake and fault, that is, a proposition 
that asserts that a belief, claim, or action is or was wrong in some respect, 
coupled with an argument invoking a ground to assert its wrongness which 
is made in such a way as also to assert that the person whose belief, claim, 
or action is under consideration was at fault in taking the action, or was at 
fault at the time in holding the belief or asserting the claim, or at least 
would now be at fault in continuing to do so.  This in turn entails the prop-
osition that there can be legitimate grounds to assert the wrongness of a be-
lief or action, and to criticize another for so believing or acting.  At base, an 
assertion of error in this sense is an attack on both the truth of and the justi-
fication for an explicit or implied (through action) knowledge claim, thus 
connecting the concept of error intimately with the most common tradition-
al definition of knowledge as “justified true belief.”11 
On a general level, the territory of belief, claim, or action subject to a 
potential charge of error is coterminous with the extent of potential beliefs, 
claims, or actions.  The grounds for charging error of belief or claim are at 
least equally extensive, while the grounds for charging error of action in-
clude attacks on any belief or claim that motivated the action, plus attacks 
on the propriety or rationality of the action even given the accuracy of 
those beliefs or claims. 
Again on a general level, the range of grounds for charging error include 
such things as divine revelation, logical inconsistency, esthetic preference, 
and a multitude more.  For our purposes we must very quickly narrow both 
the kinds of belief, claim, or action under consideration, and the grounds 
that will be considered in-bounds for making a charge of error.  After all, 
our main focus is expertise proffered in courts of law, and forensic science 
as it is currently practiced, and the kinds of error and the kinds of argument 
properly under consideration in this context are considerably (and blessed-
ly) much narrower than the entire possible field of the erroneous. 
Within this more constrained field, the notion of error and the acceptable 
grounds for asserting error become much more limited.  First, as previously 
noted, we are dealing with beliefs or claims concerning empirical facts in 
the world.  Both the grounds for justifying such beliefs and the grounds for 
attacking them are limited, in general, by notions of empirical evidence, ei-
ther of the critical common sense variety, or of the formal variety which is 
 
 11. On the centrality of “justified true belief” in the “standard analysis” of knowledge, 
see, e.g., SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY: A PRAGMATIST RECONSTRUCTION OF EPIS-
TEMOLOGY 306 (expanded ed. 2009); MICHAEL WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE 17-19 
(2001). 
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the domain of science in the modern sense of the word.12  So a charge of 
error in the normative sense is a charge that the person or group has beliefs 
that are unwarranted by empirical evidence, or undertakes various practices 
the results of which do not mean or deliver what is claimed for them.13  In 
this sense, a claim of error may be a profoundly serious moral claim, espe-
cially if the alleged errors are taken as truth by various social actors in a 
way that injures a human or a group of humans. 
However, there is another way the term “error” is commonly used, espe-
cially in the setting of science,14 and most especially in the science of test-
ing (the most relevant scientific discipline for our purposes, as we shall 
see), where there is no normative charge at all, at least in the primary set-
ting in which the word “error” is invoked.  This approach to “error” only 
applies to results, and it is a purely post hoc judgment.  In this context, a 
decision based upon a belief that something is the case, or even that is it 
most likely to be the case, is an error if it turns out wrong, no matter how 
strong the warrant for the belief.  On the other hand, a decision that turns 
out right because the hoped-for result obtains, is generally not an error.15  A 
set of four hypotheticals will illustrate the contrast between the two notions 
of error. 
 
 12. See D. Michael Risinger, The Irrelevance, and Central Relevance, of the Boundary 
Between Science and Non-Science in the Evaluation of Expert Witness Reliability, 52 VIL-
LANOVA L. REV. 679, 705-06 (2007). 
 13. Normative theories of error have the most difficulty with inadvertent actions that 
result in unintended bad consequences.  Theories of negligence are essentially attempts to 
bring a normative theory of error to bear on such actions. 
 14. The entire frame of reference for the error taxonomy set out in REASON, supra note 
4, is in general a version of the non-normative frame of science, although, since Reason is 
concerned not only with defining and understanding types of error, but also with designing 
systems with an eye to taking steps to prevent errors, normative judgments must be reim-
ported at the system design level to determine the proper prescribed responses to errors ne-
cessary to minimize them. See id. at 194-95 (distinguishing between “errors” simplicitur and 
“violations”).  In its modern cradle period, scientific thought did not always separate the ob-
jective and normative approaches to error. See, e.g., Francis Bacon’s famous discussion of 
“idols” of the mind as sources of error in 1 FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM, at pts. 1-68 
(1620), reprinted in 30 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 107-16 (Robert M. Hutchins 
ed., 1952).  The primary initial locus for the objective concept of error appears to have been 
precipitated by contemplation of measurement error. See EDWARD G. BORING, A HISTORY OF 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 134-35 (1929).  From there it expanded to cover statistical er-
ror in all sorts of settings.  See, e.g., YARDLEY BEERS, INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF ER-
ROR (1957) (observational and statistical errors in physics), including the standard empirical 
testing literature represented by Chapter 4 of the NAS Report. See, e.g., Brad J. Bickerstaff, 
Comparing Diagnostic Tests: A Simple Graphic Using Likelihood Ratios, 19 STAT. MED. 
649 (2000). 
 15. Theories of probability and counterfactual prediction can be brought to bear to cha-
racterize both intentional and negligent acts that turn out well as errors in an objective sense, 
but we need not pursue this for the purposes of this paper. 
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Assume that, in a basic five-card draw poker game, a player draws to an 
inside straight believing this to be a good strategy.16  He does not fill the 
straight.  Was the decision to draw an error?  Clearly from the objective 
point of view the answer must be yes.  The result was not the one intended 
or desired or hoped for, and it redounded to the player’s detriment in the 
player’s own terms.  But what about the normative perspective?  Here the 
answer is likely to be yes also.  One of the first general rules one learns in 
regard to playing poker is that it is a bad gamble to draw to an inside 
straight.  The chances of filling it are remote, and the hand without the fill 
is nearly worthless.  So by the standards of intelligent poker play, assuming 
the object is to win, the belief that drawing to an inside straight is an intel-
ligent strategy, whether based on ignorance or mistaken belief that could 
have been avoided by reflection or education, or on a belief in the special 
instinctive hunch powers of the player in spite of knowing the odds, is an 
error, and the act based on that belief, is an error.  And this would be so 
whether the player filled the straight or not (which will happen a little more 
than once every twelve attempts).17  A belief that this is a good strategy is 
still an error, and a lucky shot even knowing the odds doesn’t change the 
arguments concerning the nature of the action (decision), since this is al-
ways analyzed ex ante.  The “no harm, no foul” principle does not apply to 
the determination of normative error. 
But in the objective framework, the filled straights would not count as 
“errors” at all, since this is always analyzed ex post merely by reference to 
desired results. 
Now consider this further homely hypothetical.  A person notices that 
the (donated) prize at a church lottery is worth more than the total cost of 
the one thousand lottery tickets to be sold.  He has arrived after only one 
ticket has been sold.  He buys the other 999 tickets.  The only ticket he has 
not bought is the winner.  Was it an error to buy the 999 tickets? 
From the objective perspective, the ticket purchase would be an error, 
since the decision came out wrong, albeit against long odds.  Again, the 
 
 16. An “inside straight” hand is any hand with mixed suits having four out of five num-
bers for a straight (2, 3, 5, 6, for example), but missing a number, not on the end of the se-
ries (which could be completed by any card bearing the number on either end), but a number 
in the middle, which can thus be completed by drawing only a card with one specific num-
ber on it.  As noted in the text, one of the first heuristic rules that a beginning poker player 
learns is “never draw to an inside straight,” and in fact this was a part of the tagline ex-
change upon parting between gambling brothers Bret and Bart Maverick in the original Ma-
verick TV series. (“Never hold a kicker”; “Never draw to an inside straight.”) (original 
memory on file with author). 
 17. Four cards out of the remaining forty-seven unknown cards will fill, so drawing one 
of the four will happen about every 11.75 attempts. 
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classification as error rests on comparing actual outcomes to desired out-
comes ex post.  But from the normative perspective the decision was not 
erroneous, since the belief that motivated the action was fully justified, and 
provided an adequate ground for the action based upon it.18 
As a general proposition, the objective approach to error is the approach 
most commonly adopted in the sciences, and particularly in regard to ap-
proaches to hypothesis testing and the design and evaluation of tests in 
scientific contexts, whereas the normative framework is the approach most 
commonly embraced in most other areas of endeavor.19 
At this point you may start to have an inkling of how a failure to account 
for these two common and competing notions of the essence of error might 
result in misunderstanding and hurt feelings when claims about error are 
made from the objective perspective of science, but heard as normative at-
tacks alleging negligence or worse by the members of the group under dis-
cussion.  I believe this has contributed to the defensiveness of various parts 
of the forensic science community when the question of error and error 
rates in forensic science has been raised.  And to a substantial extent, I 
think this has been the fault of Sherlock Holmes, a point to which I will re-
turn below. 
First, however, the perceptive reader will have noticed that I have just 
used the terms “error” and “error rates” together in such a way as to echo 
their use in the majority opinion in Daubert.20  What did the court intend 
by those words in that opinion? 
One of the most troubling aspects of the Daubert opinion is the unthink-
ing way in which the Court tossed off the so-called “Daubert factors.”  As I 
have pointed out elsewhere, while it has become conventional (though not 
universal) to speak of “the four Daubert factors,” it is not even clear how 
many “Daubert factors” there really are.21  And beyond the issue of proper 
 
 18. We are, of course, bypassing any discussion of the deeper normative question, the 
moral question about whether it is proper to take advantage of one’s superior knowledge of 
the item donated (and thus not subject to the direct knowledge of the church authorities re-
garding value) in order to deprive the charity of the excess marginal value of the prize above 
the total realized by selling all the tickets. 
 19.  In this way the concept of error tracks usage pattern similar to that of the notion of 
“bias,” one factor that can account for objective errors in the results of various processes. 
For a discussion of the normatively neutral concept of bias in psychology, see D. Michael 
Risinger, Michael J. Saks, William C. Thompson & Robert Rosenthal, The Daubert/Kumho 
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and 
Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (2002). 
 20. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 21. Referring to “four” factors has become standard, though the real number of factors is 
subject to debate.  The Daubert opinion spake thus, without numbering factors: “a key ques-
tion [in regard to a theory or technique] . . . will be whether it can be (and has been) tested.” 
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enumeration, the Court’s language has created many more problems in the 
lower courts than it has solved.  Here I will concentrate on the issues raised 
by the Court’s invocation of “known and potential error rate” as something 
to be considered in determining whether proposed expert testimony is suf-
ficiently reliable for the purposes of the law under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702. 
I have reflected on that puzzle for nearly two decades, and as near as I 
can figure, neither Justice Blackmun, nor the other Justices, nor whatever 
law clerk may have supplied the locution, had a clear idea of what was 
meant, or how it should be or would be interpreted.  Here is the pertinent 
language from the opinion: “[I]n the case of a particular scientific tech-
nique, the court should consider the known or potential rate of error.”22  
The Court then cites United States v. Smith, a 1989 Seventh Circuit case 
which it says surveyed “studies of the error rate of the spectrographic voice 
identification technique.”23  So the drafter of this language in Daubert ap-
 
509 U.S. at 593.  “Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has 
been subjected to peer review and publication.  Publication (which is but one element of 
peer review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility . . . .” Id.  “Additionally, in the case of a 
particular scientific technique, the court should consider the known or potential rate of error 
. . . and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation.” 
Id. at 594.  “Finally, ‘general acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.” Id.  These 
were summarized in Kumho Tire as “several factors” without numbering, but with four bul-
let points. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1999).  However, it is easy 
to separate whether a claim “can be tested” (its empirical nature or theoretical falsifiability) 
and the degree to which it has been subjected to actual testing, into two separable but nested 
factors.  In addition, the potential rate of error is arguably always 100% in the absence of 
some kind of testing (though not necessarily the kind of formal testing that would lead to 
more specific and quantifiable knowledge of an error rate).  Knowledge of error rates is thus 
a product of testing.  In addition, can “standards of control” for a technique’s operation be a 
relevant factor if there is no reason to believe such “standards” enhance reliability?  This too 
would seem to be a question of testing, at least in some contexts.  Finally, a fortiori “general 
acceptance” is the product of peer review, so one can argue that there are really eight expli-
citly referenced “Daubert factors” (falsifiability, testing, peer review, publication, potential 
error rate, known error rate, standards of practice, general acceptance) or only three (falsi-
fiability, testing which reveals error rate, peer review).  In addition, the Daubert Court in-
vokes the relevance-based concept of “fit,” 509 U.S. at 591, which is perhaps best seen as an 
analogue to “external validity,” and which can easily be asserted as a fifth (or ninth, or 
fourth) “Daubert factor.” See Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and 
Expert Reliability, How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 15, 32 n.64 (2003).  Courts have not always referred to four Daubert factors, either.  
See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 266-67 (4th Cir. 2003) (five factors); United 
States v. Prime, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1204 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (five factors); United States 
v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 278, 284 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999) (six factors). The Advisory Com-
mittee’s note for the 2000 revision of Rule 702 lists five factors, but then adds five more that 
were derived from intervening case authority. 
 22. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 23. Id. at 594 (quoting United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 352-54 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
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peared to have in mind how well a “particular scientific technique” oper-
ates to do the job humans use it for.  I have phrased this carefully to lead up 
to the next point.  Assuming standard protocols are defined and observed, 
techniques, tests, processes, and the like, scientific or not, do not them-
selves commit “errors” per se.  They merely have results.  It is the use to 
which humans put those results that constitutes or gives rise to error in the 
objective sense when they turn out to generate wrong answers to the ques-
tions addressed.  However, in many testing fields it is common (although 
not universal) to speak somewhat loosely and ascribe resulting errors to the 
test in a kind of short hand.  Thus, a test may be said virtually interchange-
ably to have a “false positive rate” (which definitely is a characterization of 
the test results per se) and a “false positive error rate” (which is actually a 
characterization of what occurs when humans make use of the test by ap-
plying it at face value as a heuristic in a particular way to make decisions, 
take actions, etc.).  Note that in either case, the “error” that is referred to is 
simply an inaccurate correspondence between test result and true condi-
tions in particular cases, independent of any necessary criticism or assertion 
of fault in regard to anyone’s actions, beliefs, or decisions. 
So it would appear that the Court in Daubert seemed to have had in 
mind the objective notion of error applied conventionally to tests and tech-
niques in the area of scientific hypothesis testing in general and the testing 
of various asserted diagnostic tests in particular. This would make sense 
given its reference to a forensic science case as illustrative, since, taken on 
a general level, most of forensic science deals with various kinds of 
processes and tests claimed to be diagnostic of one thing or another—the 
fact that a test result indicates that a certain crime scene residue can be at-
tributed to a particular source, for example.24 
 
 24. The security of this conclusion about what the Court had in mind is undermined a bit 
by the invocation of the mysterious phrase “potential error rate.”  If the phrase “potential 
error rate” is a term of art with a determinate meaning in some technical area, I haven’t dis-
covered it yet.  On its face the concept verges on nonsensical, especially when apparently 
contrasted with “known error rate.”  If a diagnostic test is put forward with no information 
on how often apparently positive results indicating the condition of interest are false, and 
how often apparently negative results are true, then the “potential error rate” that could re-
sult from adopting the test is 100% (which is much worse than random).  This is because it 
is theoretically possible to have a process that is reliably always wrong (and remember, in 
the hypothetical, we have no information indicating that this is untrue of the test in ques-
tion).  Of course, if this is known, and if the issue is a binary issue of yes/no or right/wrong 
(as it is in most forensic identification contexts, at least), then such a process could be used 
as a perfectly accurate process by always accepting the opposite of its output as true.  But 
that assumes that this circumstance is known.  If it is not known and the process is taken at 
face value, then the actual error rate resulting from relying on the process would be 100%, 
which, again, would be much worse than random.  It is unlikely that any process actually 
fulfills the 100% potential error rate possibility, but some processes when tested do some-
RISINGER_CHRISTENSEN 1/31/2011  2:22 PM 
530 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVIII 
If, as it appears reasonably likely, the Supreme Court in Daubert had this 
notion of “error” in mind, it is clear that the NAS Committee explicitly 
adopted this as its model of error.  Indeed, more than half of Chapter 4 of 
the NAS Report, “The Principles of Science and Interpreting Scientific Da-
ta” is devoted to explaining this notion of error in the context of testing, 
with worked examples.25  Whether this twenty-four-page chapter captures 
all that would be suggested by its title is debatable, but it certainly de-
scribes the main characteristics of science’s idea of error in regard to vali-
dation testing well enough.  It sets out the standard procedure for determin-
ing the diagnosticity of a binary test for a condition such as a disease—
creating a test population made up both of subjects known to have the con-
dition of interest and known not to have the condition, running the test un-
der evaluation on that population, and entering the results in the familiar 2 
x 2 four-cell matrix for false positives, true positives, false negatives and 
true negatives, then deriving from those results figures for sensitivity, spe-
cificity, positive predictive value, and negative predictive value.  The Re-
port then sets out the results of a hypothetical validation study of this nature 
that might be performed on the visual hair comparison technique, and the 
light its results might shed on the common origin of two hairs, one from a 
crime scene and one from a person of interest in regard to that crime.  This 
clearly represents the fundamental structure for validation of heretofore un-
validated forensic techniques envisioned as necessary by the NAS Commit-
tee. 
 
times score worse than random.  Bite mark identification is one notorious example.  See the 
results of proficiency tests taken by members of the American Board of Forensic Odontolo-
gists set out in Michael Bowers, Identification from Bitemarks: Scientific Issues, 4 MOD. 
SCI. EVIDENCE 680-87 (David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks, Joseph Sanders, 
Edward K. Cheng eds. 2009).  To make a long story short, the “potential error rate” is in this 
view the same as the “known error rate” whenever there is any knowledge warranting the 
conclusion that the potential error rate is not 100%. 
  Or perhaps the Court meant the notion of known error rate to be reserved for cir-
cumstances where there is good empirical evidence that indicates a fairly mathematically 
determinate error rate, and the notion of potential error rate was to cover limits of error rates 
known by reference to more qualitative and less quantitative sources of information, which 
establish broad ranges of potential error which are indeterminate at their specific bounda-
ries.  Or perhaps it was a caution meant to remind people that false positive and false nega-
tive rates are not the same as error rates if they are being applied to test subjects drawn from 
a candidate universe with base rates of occurrence of the condition in question different 
from the “known-condition” population that was used to generate the rates for true and false 
positives and true and false negatives to begin with (although that seems unlikely).  Perhaps 
the best thing to do with the concept of “potential error rate” would be to ignore it, as I have 
largely done in the text.  Unfortunately, since it was uttered by the Supreme Court, litigants 
and lower courts find themselves obliged to deal with it in some way which is generally des-
tined to make very little sense. 
 25. NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 111-25. 
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It also represents the Committee’s adoption of science’s standard objec-
tive notion of error when techniques are used as tests of common origin—
how often a human using the test as determinative would be wrong (or in 
error, if you will).  But the Report is careful to note that the accuracy of the 
test is dependent on the question it is being used to answer.  They designed 
their hypothetical visual hair comparison test to be directed at determining 
only whether such comparison would be accurate in assigning hairs to pre-
designated classes of hair.  They emphasized that “this accuracy evaluation 
does not apply to other tasks that are beyond the goal of the particular anal-
ysis, such as pinpointing the individual from whom the specimen was ob-
tained.”26  This is of course right as far as it goes, and anyone who has ever 
read anything I have written in this area knows that I will applaud the reali-
zation that validation is a task-specific enterprise.27 
Earlier in the Report, however, the Committee made an observation, that 
perhaps, if developed properly, has the potential to ameliorate at least to 
some degree the feeling among forensic scientists of being wrongly 
charged willy nilly with error in a normative sense: 
 Assertions of a “100 percent match” contradict the findings of profi-
ciency tests that find substantial rates of erroneous results in some discip-
lines (i.e., voice identification, bite mark analysis). 
 As an example, in a [sic] FBI publication on the correlation of micro-
scopic and mitochondrial DNA hair comparisons, the authors found that 
even competent hair examiners can make significant errors.  In this study, 
the authors found that in 11 percent of the cases in which the hair examin-
ers declared two hairs to be “similar,” subsequent DNA testing revealed 
that the hairs did not match, which refers either to the competency or the 
relative ability of the two divergent techniques to identify differences in 
hair samples, as well as to the probative value of each test.28 
In the referenced article by Houck and Budowle, the authors are at pains 
to say that the results of their study do not indicate that the visual hair com-
parisons were “erroneous,” but merely indicate the difference in resolving 
 
 26. NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 120. 
 27. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic 
Science After Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000);  D. Michael 
Risinger, Goodbye to all That or a Fool’s Errand, by One of the Fools: How I Stopped Wor-
rying About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and Forensic Science in Gen-
eral) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. 
REV. 447 (2007). 
 28. NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 47 (citing Max M. Houck and Bruce Budowle, Corre-
lation of Microscopic and Mitochondrial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 964 
(2002) (other internal citations omitted)) (emphasis supplied). 
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power between the visual technique and mtDNA analysis.29  They are, in 
essence, saying that in classifying the pairs of hairs in each case as visually 
indistinguishable according to the standards of their discipline, the visual 
hair analysts were not mistaken.  This brings into play not only the objec-
tive versus normative versions of the concept of error, but another distinc-
tion which is one of the few helpful taxonomic plays in the philosophic lite-
rature on “error,” the Israeli philosopher of science Giora Hon’s proposed 
distinction between error proper and mistake.30  For Hon, a mistake is 
something which is wrong by reference to determinate criteria conceded to 
be applicable to a belief, act, or decision within the normal practice of an 
area of knowledge.31  A calculation error is a mistake.  Flipping the wrong 
switch in a cockpit is a mistake.  In visual hair comparison, mixing up 
samples would be a mistake, and mischaracterizing color would be a mis-
take.  The point here is that people who make mistakes do so through kinds 
of inattention or sloppy practice for which they are responsible, and it is 
proper to criticize them for such mistakes.  Mistakes and various proce-
dures for their elimination, or at least reducing them to a minimum, are the 
stuff of human factors research and rumination.  They are also the stuff of 
accreditation, individual certification, and so forth.  I am convinced that 
most forensic science practitioners think that all the error talk they hear is 
charging them with making large numbers of mistakes which they feel sure 
is not the case, and they feel put upon as a result.  But the most serious 
sources of error in the objective sense are not mistakes, but inherent limita-
tions on the precision of tests utilized—their diagnosticity, if you will, de-
termined by analogy to specificity and sensitivity in other contexts, their 
false and true positive and negative results as applied to the tasks they are 
used as tools to resolve, just as in the case of other diagnostic tests.  Such 
bad outcomes are not due to practitioner mistake, but to limitations in the 
technique even when perfectly applied.  This, in Hon’s terms, is the stuff of 
error.32 
Hon’s fairly rudimentary taxonomic move is quite helpful and potential-
ly fruitful, but of course it does not accommodate or distinguish between 
many kinds or sources of objective error.  To accommodate those types, we 
must move to the much more sophisticated error taxonomies to be found in 
the psychological “human factors” and “error studies” literature, perhaps 
 
 29. Houck & Budowle, supra note 28, at 966. 
 30. See Hon, supra note 5. 
 31. Id. at 6. 
 32. Id. at 6-10. 
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best represented by that outlined by James Reason in 1990.33  For instance, 
while it is hopefully rare, errors that are hard to classify as “mistakes” can 
resort from affirmative malfeasance such as “dry labbing,”34 and from le-
vels of disregard of good practice that cross a line between mistake due to 
inadvertence or simple negligence, to gross negligence approaching affir-
mative malfeasance.  These types of error source are easily accommodated 
under Reason’s rubric of “violations.”35  On the other end, wrong results 
stemming from observer effects that induce unconscious bias which 
changes decision thresholds are hard to classify even as negligent mistake 
on the part of the individual examiner, given the unconscious nature of the 
phenomenon, and the failure of those above their pay grade to adopt any 
protocols to control the precursors of such observer effects.  But Hon’s 
simple distinction still makes an important foundational point: There are 
wrong results that are properly regarded as somebody’s fault, and errors 
that are no-fault—that is, they are an inevitable result of the imperfections 
 
 33. See REASON, supra note 4.  Reason’s book is marked both by its historical account 
of the development of such contemplations of human error and how to control them, and by 
its taxonomic sophistication as well as its substantive conclusions, and is clearly the classic 
of this literature.  However, it must be noted that Reason’s work grew from a rich ferment 
that began with Professor of Mechanical Engineering John W. Senders’ organization of two 
important conferences to study “error as a behavioral phenomenon in its own right rather 
than simply as an index of performance.” JOHN W. SENDERS & NEVILLE P. MORAY, HUMAN 
ERROR: CAUSE, PREDICTION AND REDUCTION 9 (1991).  These were the 1980 Human Error 
Conference in Columbia Falls, Maine in 1980, and (in collaboration with Neville P. Moray) 
the Conference on the Nature and Sources of Human Error in Bellagio, Italy in 1983.  Pro-
fessor Reason was a participant in both, and acknowledged their seminal value. REASON, 
supra note 4.  Senders and Moray worked for a number of years on a volume to summarize 
the various questions posed and positions taken by the participants in those conferences both 
during the conferences and in later publications and follow-up responses to Senders’ inqui-
ries.  This volume, SENDERS & MORAY, supra, was not published until the year after Rea-
son’s book, but it contains much of interest in its own right on the general nature of the 
questions then in play among the “error studies” community, and should actually be read not 
only in conjunction with Reason’s book, but ideally before it. 
 34. “Dry labbing” occurs when a forensic technician simply fills in the results of a test 
report without actually doing the tests. See Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Fo-
rensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 184 (2007). 
 35. “Violations” are intentional decisions not to follow standard procedures, sometimes 
because risks appear slight, and sometimes for more questionable reasons. REASON, supra 
note 4, at 194-95.  Reason classifies error according to the cognitive processing level upon 
which they occur.  “Slips and lapses,” occur when recurrent skilled routines miscarry, most 
commonly because of attention disturbances.  “Rule-based errors” occur when a decision 
maker selects the wrong pre-packaged routine or rule for a problem that is presented, often 
when a skill miscarries; “knowledge-based errors” occur when one has no proper rule or 
heuristic to resort to and must attempt to solve a problem presented by conscious analysis 
from general principles. See id. at 94 fig.3.1.  While each of these distinctions is important, I 
actually prefer Hon’s term “mistakes” as an umbrella term to cover all of these together, and 
to distinguish between such “mistakes” and error flowing from weak diagnosticity on the 
one hand, and “violations” on the other, and I have so used it in the text. 
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of our knowledge at any given time.  And there are errors that are not the 
fault of the bench analyst, who is doing everything right according to his 
training and his role in the system, but may properly be regarded as the 
fault of the persons who are in positions of power over the process, because 
those in power now have available to them new information that makes it at 
least a mistake, and perhaps worse in its willful disregard, not to undertake 
the changes in the standards and practices that would reduce error to its un-
avoidable minimum.36 
No one likes to be wrong.37  And everybody likes to be right. This tru-
ism has been the subject of a considerable amount of published reflection 
recently,38 the point of which is to argue roughly that: (1) The double phe-
nomenon is motivated by feelings of rightness (or “knowing” or belief) and 
wrongness that are inherently pleasant and unpleasant respectively, being 
analogous to positive and negative emotions in their deployment of neuro-
chemical rewards; (2) The evolutionary benefits of such a reward system 
are substantial, motivating and sustaining all sorts of behaviors such as 
hunting, exploring, etc.; and (3) that the buzz we get from feeling right can 
lead to all sorts of gambling behaviors and over-investments of belief on 
thin evidence, so long as the likelihood of being shown to be wrong by evi-
dence that cannot be ignored is low (which it usually is, given our ability to 
 
 36. In a recent article, James M. Doyle has proposed dealing with the whole problem of 
inaccurate results in the criminal justice system by the adoption of an error studies approach 
modeled on that adopted in recent medical quality control efforts, particularly those cham-
pioned by Dr. David Berwick, and reflected in the landmark National Institute of Medicine 
publication TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Cohen, Janet 
M. Corrigan & Molla S. Donaldson eds., National Academies Press, 2000). See James M. 
Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY. 
109, 119 et seq. (2010).  The vast implications and potential objections to such an approach 
are of course beyond the scope of this article. 
  In a narrower context, a group (of which I was a member) led by Jennifer Mnookin 
has very recently recommended that similar mechanisms be adopted in order to allow such 
an approach to error, and to the lessons to be learned from clearly identified instances of er-
ror, in forensic science practice. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Simon A. Cole, Itiel E. Dror, Bar-
ry A. Fisher, Max Houck, Keith Inman, David H. Kaye, Jonathan J. Koehler, Glenn Lan-
genburg, D. Michael Risinger, Norah Rudin, Jay Siegel & David A. Stoney, The Need for a 
Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2011) 
(manuscript 53-57) (on file with authors). 
 37. On the powerful unpleasantness of the feeling of having been wrong, see SCHULZ, 
supra note 4, at 25-27. 
 38. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 4, at 1-40.  Burton is a neurologist.  The main object 
of his book seems to be to elevate certain “feelings,” most particularly the feeling of “know-
ing” to phenomena on a par with emotions in their ability act as neurochemical motivating 
rewards (or punishments).  “. . . [T]he feeling of knowing and its kindred feelings should be 
considered as primary as the state of fear and anger.” Id. at 40. 
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ignore counterevidence once we have obtained the feeling of rightness, in 
order to avoid the feeling of wrongness). 
Now of course all of this is currently highly conjectural and in the be-
ginning stages of investigation.  But the general insight that there is a neur-
al reward system underlying feelings of rightness, knowing and belief in-
dependent of content, which resists revision that would trigger the 
unpleasant feeling of being wrong and promotes various rationalizing be-
haviors in the face of new evidence, seems to me likely to prove right in 
some form.  Assuming this to be the case, people seeking to improve foren-
sic science as it is currently practiced in order to eliminate as many sources 
of error as possible must take into account these sources of resistance, and 
take such reasonable steps as are available to ameliorate them.  It is perhaps 
a small contribution to that end to point out that the vast majority of foren-
sic practitioners in accredited laboratories probably make relatively few 
mistakes in their performance of the standard skill-based practices that they 
have been taught.  Furthermore, it could hardly be expected of them to re-
ject the prevailing group view of both the powers of their discipline and the 
reasons for believing in those powers when they were taught those things 
as part of their training and practice.  They inevitably came to regard those 
positions as right, with all that that entails in regard to the rewards of belief 
and the difficulty of revision.  These beliefs were promulgated in reliance 
on apparently well-grounded authority, and seemed reasonable at the time.  
While errors in the objective sense may be attributed to the deficiencies of 
that vision exposed by new information and fresh reflection, it would be 
wrong to attribute those errors normatively to those that practice what they 
have been taught with few mistakes according to the standards, prevailing 
beliefs and practices of the enterprise in which they are embedded.  Wheth-
er a similar absolution can be given to the leaders of the forensic science 
enterprise is another question, to which I will return below. 
I have said earlier, somewhat cryptically perhaps, that I blame Sherlock 
Holmes.  In fact, I have written somewhat extensively in other places about 
why I think it is reasonable to blame Holmes, and the strong version of “he-
roic positivism” that he represented and helped to popularize (especially in 
the budding forensic science fields of the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries) for some of the failure of forensic science to adopt a more 
modern vision of science and its requirements than it has done. 
It has always been striking to me the extent to which practitioners of fo-
rensic science in general and the traditional pattern matching disciplines in 
particular, took for their patron and the instantiation of their self image, 
their ideals, and their mission, not a flesh and blood human pioneer who 
had advanced the science of their enterprise in some empirically reliable 
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way, but an imaginary person: Sherlock Holmes.  As I have written pre-
viously, 
 [E]mbracing Holmes in this way is perhaps understandable.  As I just 
indicated, many of these areas of forensic practice and claimed expertise 
grew up in the same late Victorian period in which Holmes held forth 
from the imaginary address of 221B Baker Street, and some credibility 
was bestowed upon them directly by Holmes himself by references in the 
stories.  So it is easy to see how those interested and involved in develop-
ing these emerging forensic specialties might view Holmes as a kind of 
avatar of their enterprise, and an ideal toward which to direct their efforts.  
This identification had some good effects perhaps, but it also had signifi-
cant bad effects, trapping these “forensic sciences” in a late Victorian 
model of thought which both stunted their growth and limited their relia-
bility, while at the same time providing an explanatory account of their 
claims to expertise which would be embraced by courts, and (given the 
conservative nature of the legal system and the judges within it) be re-
tained by courts as their world view long after its expiration date. . . . 
 The Holmes presented in the Canon is the superman of 19th century 
positivism.  He is embedded in a world in which certain knowledge of an 
event is in principle always attainable from later circumstances, if only a 
person knows enough and can process what is known correctly.  This is 
the fundamental position first given voice in the early 19th century by, 
ironically, the probability theorist Henri LaPlace (and still embraced by 
some).  It was so congenial to the 19th century materialist determinism 
(positivism) that it became the dominant lens of the scientifically minded 
for all phenomena, including human motivation.  As Stephen Kern ex-
plains in the introduction to his recent, brilliant book A CULTURAL HIS-
TORY OF CAUSALITY: 
 A materialist determinism applied to mental life peaked with the 
“mental physiologists”, such as Henry Maudsley, who, in 1874, ar-
gued that “lunatics and criminals are as much manufactured articles 
as are steam-engines and calico printing machines.”  The French es-
sayist and fictionist Paul Bourget elaborated such thinking in his nov-
el The Disciple (1889) which ridiculed the extreme positivism of one 
arrogant character, who updated Pierre LaPlace’s famous determinist 
hypothesis of 1814 in speculating “if we could know correctly the 
relative position of all the phenomena which constitute the actual un-
iverse, we could, from the present, calculate with certainty equal to 
that of the astronomers the day, the hour and the minute when Eng-
land will evacuate India . . . or when a criminal, still unborn, will 
murder his father.” 
 What was intended as caricature by Bourget was not so intended by 
Conan Doyle, however, in one of the early Holmes stories, “The Case of 
the Five Orange Pips”: 
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 “The ideal reasoner” [Holmes] remarked “would, when he had 
once been shown a single fact in all its bearings, deduce from it not 
only all the chain of events which led up to it but also all the results 
which would follow from it.  As Cuvier could correctly describe a 
whole animal by the contemplation of a single bone, so the observer 
who has thoroughly understood one link in a series of incidents 
should be able to accurately state all the other ones, both before and 
after.  We have not yet grasped the results which the reason alone can 
attain to.  Problems may be solved in the study which have baffled all 
those who have sought a solution by the aid of their senses.  To carry 
the art, however, to its highest pitch, it is necessary that the reasoner 
should be able to utilize all the facts which have come to his know-
ledge, and this implies, as you will readily see, the possession of all 
knowledge, which, even in these days of free education and encyclo-
pedias, is a somewhat rare accomplishment; it is not so impossible, 
however, that a man should possess all knowledge which is likely to 
be useful to him in his work, and this I have endeavored to do.” 
 There are two ways this LaPlacian theoretical statement can be taken.  
One is to accept it as some near-metaphysical statement of a practically 
unattainable state of knowledge, then operationally disregard it when 
going about the pragmatic job of assembling and evaluating very imper-
fect “best available” information.  The other is to accept the account, à la 
Holmes, as something surprisingly close at hand, at least for some kinds 
of knowledge, if we but attend.  The first construction leaves actual know-
ledge to approach the unattainable ideal as near as claimants may estab-
lish by empirical evidence, accepting that it will often be not very close at 
all, given the limitations of the human condition.  The second construction 
both accepts as likely the attainability of such knowledge, and accepts as 
strongly plausible those who make claims to it based on their personal 
magic over such observational data as they gather.  The latter attitude we 
may refer to as pathological positivism.  And it is clear from the quotation 
and from many others in the Sherlockian Canon, that it is this form of pa-
thological positivism that is represented by both Holmes’s attitudes and 
Holmes’s performances.  Holmes is the Wizard of inference.  He does not 
practice science, he practices magic.39 
The extreme positivist embrace of the potential availability of certain 
knowledge to the individual observer undertaking a sanctioned and discip-
lined method of observation appeals to many humans (vide astrology), al-
though science was busily moving itself past this view into a frame of ref-
erence in which knowledge was viewed as fundamentally probabilistic and 
 
 39. D. Michael Risinger, Boxes in Boxes: Julian Barnes, Conan Doyle, Sherlock Holmes 
and the Edalji Case, INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE, Dec. 2006, at 1, 6-9, available at 
http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol4/iss2/art3 (internal footnotes omitted). 
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the enterprise of science fundamentally communal even as the popular em-
brace of heroic positivism reached its zenith in the early twentieth century.  
Heroic positivism continues to flourish today in the popular mind as a ten-
able account of the science.  More to the point, it is clearly the dominant 
and romanticized lens through which forensic science is popularly viewed, 
as anyone familiar with Patricia Cornwell novels or various CSI programs 
can attest.  And even more to the point, as I have previously indicated, it is 
at the core of the account forensic scientists in the pattern matching discip-
lines give about themselves.  It is this heroic positivist paradigm that ac-
counts for why fingerprint examiners believe that they can be justified in 
asserting that they can perfectly determine that a latent print found at a 
crime scene can be attributed to the ridged skin of a single individual to the 
exclusion of all other potential sources in the universe. 
In a broadly cited article in Science,40 Michael Saks and Jonathan Koeh-
ler spoke of “the coming paradigm shift” in forensic science.  What they 
were envisioning was essentially the replacement of the outdated heroic 
positivist foundational views of forensic science with a set of views about 
the enterprise of science drawn from more modern approaches, which had 
displaced the heroic positivist paradigm in virtually every other area claim-
ing to practice science in the modern sense.  The NAS Committee Report is 
a very significant event fostering this shift.  I retain enough of the old posi-
tivist faith in progress and historical directionality to believe that this is vir-
tually inevitable in the long run.  How long the run is going to be is un-
clear, however.  As Thomas Kuhn, the originator of the notion of paradigm 
shift in the history of science, famously observed, it often takes a genera-
tion or more for a change to occur.41  This is because the full shift must 
await the passing of the last generation personally invested in the rightness 
of the traditional paradigm, who, by weight of seniority, are in control posi-
tions within the structure of the enterprise and are thus situated to resist the 
new paradigm’s full acceptance until they are no longer influential.42  The 
transition period may see a lot of attempts at compromise and middle 
grounds, with people in control giving only as much as is made absolutely 
necessary by external circumstance or internal politics. It seems clear that 
the enterprise of forensic science is in this condition now.  How long this 
 
 40. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic 
Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892 (2005). 
 41. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). 
 42. Id. at 122-30.  Kuhn quotes Max Plank: “[A] new scientific truth does not triumph 
by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents 
eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.” Id. at 124. 
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fundamentally chaotic and unsatisfactory condition can last only time will 
tell. 
One thing that is clear is that the fact that forensic science is lodged in 
the legal system, and serves the criminal justice branch of the legal system 
as its primary consumer, has not helped to foster the change.  Having ac-
cepted forensic science on its old paradigmatic terms decades ago, the judi-
ciary has been as resistant as the leaders of the forensic science community 
to embracing anything that would result in significant rejection of the cur-
rent forensic science product, or call into question the wisdom of having 
accepted it for so long at face value.  In addition, the intensely partisan na-
ture of trials has often driven the testifying forensic scientist into extreme 
positions either at the behest of the prosecution or in response to what was 
regarded as unfairly critical cross examination (and anyone being cross ex-
amined is likely to regard the experience as unfairly critical).  The result is 
that the legal system has reinforced the embrace of the traditional para-
digm, both by appearing to bless it and by making its invocation of certain 
knowledge grounded on experience a welcome port in the storm of cross 
examination.  As a long time observer of and participant in the legal 
process, I think I am qualified to offer the opinion, which appears to have 
been shared by the NAS Committee, that this has been a significant error. 
Which returns us to the main focus of this paper—the notion of error and 
the issue of fault. 
Some decades ago I got in trouble with the document examiner commu-
nity over an article in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.43  The 
article began with a consideration of the classic early Renaissance treatise 
Malleus Malificarum, which dealt with how to determine whether someone 
is a witch.44  The document examiners seemed to think that my co-authors 
and I were accusing them of witchcraft.  But the point actually set out in 
the paper was that even very intelligent and rational people (which the au-
thors of the treatise clearly were) could convince themselves of the reality 
of things based on weak evidence, things which better evidence might re-
veal to be inaccurate.45  This was a general point about human tendencies, 
and was not particularly and specifically directed at document examination, 
or even forensic science, but at the necessity of being careful to require 
good evidence in formulating beliefs about the accuracy of expert practices 
 
 43. D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance 
as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989). 
 44. Id. (citing HEINRICH KRAMER & JAMES SPRENGER, MALLEUS MALLIFICARUM (Mon-
tague Summers trans., Dover Editions 1971) (1486)). 
 45. Risinger, Denbeaux & Saks, supra note 43, at 731-32. 
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in general.  The real metaphor we invoked for document examination, and 
for traditional forensic identification disciplines in general, was in fact folk 
medicine, that is, areas of asserted expertise that testing would probably re-
veal to be accurate in regard to some claims but not others.46  What we la-
mented in the first instance was the failure to generate proper and reliable 
information to provide validation, and to distinguish between the accurate 
practices and the inaccurate ones. 
By “proper and reliable information” I do not necessarily mean the gen-
eration of formal data sets that yield proper quantified statistical informa-
tion bearing on validity.  Not every belief about the reliability of a process 
must be based on such data, and indeed, if we absolutely required such da-
ta, we should have to abandon many bases of inference that are well war-
ranted by critical common sense.  In this regard, I am not an acolyte of the 
great nineteenth century physicist Lord Kelvin, who claimed that only such 
formal quantified measurement could count as knowledge worth any-
thing.47  To Lord Kelvin, I say, behold this broken tea bowl.  The perfect 
puzzle fit of the fracture, corroborated by the continuity of the design, 
would warrant beyond-reasonable-doubt confidence that the two were once 
part of a single bowl, without formal data on random match probabilities.  
It seems clear, at least in vitreous materials like glass and porcelain, that 
fracture involves random forces that generate so many points of unpredict-
able and difficult- or impossible-to-reproduce correspondence that the infe-
rence of common source approaches certainty very closely. 
On the other hand, one must be extremely careful in making such claims.  
For instance, correspondences in regard to fracture or tear in other mate-
rials may be much less indicative of common source.  And I can construct 
(in fact have published) a version of the vitreous fracture argument that 
works well in regard to the accuracy of common source inferences using 
rolled fingerprints, but much less well or not at all as one begins to deal 
 
 46. Id. at 734.  This analogy was itself perhaps more inflammatory than necessary.  We 
could just as well have invoked the journey of normal medicine from unvalidated to more 
validated techniques in relatively recent times.  For a classic reflection on how much of this 
trip was only just begun in the twentieth century, see LEWIS THOMAS, THE YOUNGEST 
SCIENCE: NOTES OF A MEDICINE WATCHER (1983). 
 47.  
In physical science the first essential step in the direction of learning any subject is 
to find principles of numerical reckoning and practicable methods for measuring 
some quality connected with it.  I often say that when you can measure what you 
are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but 
when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your know-
ledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind. 
1 BARON WILLIAM THOMSON KELVIN, Electrical Units of Measurement, POPULAR LECTURES 
AND ADDRESSES 73 (1883). 
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with the problems of small or smudged latent prints.48  The burden of per-
suasive explanation should always be on those relying on such non-
quantified claims to justify the reliability of expertise absent formal data.  
This is because humans can be subject to a lot of wishful thinking and ex-
aggerated self-belief for which formal data is a great corrective, besides be-
ing valuable in itself.  For this reason, reliability assessments based on for-
mal data from well designed and appropriate studies are to be preferred, 
pursued, and cherished, even though it is often, perhaps usually, very diffi-
cult, expensive, and time-consuming to generate such data, requiring great 
care in study design and sensitivity to the fact that each sub-task in an area 
of claimed expertise must be identified and subjected to separate study.  
And as Jennifer Mnookin, Michael Saks, and I have pointed out repeatedly 
in various places,49 such data does not necessarily have to be pointed to-
ward the development of random match probability models, at least in the 
first instance.  Properly designed “black box” studies of the success or fail-
ure of practitioners under different test conditions can yield useable data 
bearing on the reliability of expert results, which can fill the gap between 
no formal reliability data and the much more difficult task of generating 
DNA-like statistical systems. 
Today I think it can be rightly said that the need for formal validation for 
many forensic science applications is well established and fairly generally 
recognized.  After the issuance of the NAS Report, most of the leaders of 
the forensic science establishment have conceded the necessity of such va-
lidation, in order to quiet criticism if nothing else.  Even while admitting 
this, however, there remain those who proclaim that such validation is a 
mere technical detail which will show that everything done in the name of 
forensic science heretofore has always yielded accurate results, at least 
when the results were derived by properly trained individuals adhering 
strictly to the procedures set out by the best authorities in the area, and all 
that is really required to eliminate error is laboratory accreditation and ex-
aminer certification.  This has been a recurrent theme in the response of the 
 
 48. See Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 21, at 66-74. 
 49. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, Machines and Experts: Problems in 
the Assessment of Legal and Scientific Validity, 5 EPISTEME 343 (2008); Michael J. Saks, 
Remediating Forensic Science, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 119, 124 (2007); Michael J. Saks, The 
Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 
229, 239 (2000); D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of 
Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508, 522 (2000); D. Michael 
Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets 
Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21, 40-41 (1996). 
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forensic community to the NAS Report.50  In my opinion this is almost cer-
tainly the product either of a public relations instinct or wishful thinking or 
both.  In the traditional forensic identification disciplines, as in folk medi-
cine, careful testing of the claims is virtually certain to find areas of unreli-
able performance, just as there are likely to be many areas of reliable per-
formance. The path forward from here to reliable knowledge of the 
accuracy of the various such disciplines in all their many claims will in-
volve a lot more research than people have been willing to admit or con-
template up to now.  The necessary studies will run at least into the hun-
dreds over the course of many years, and will require the full and 
committed cooperation of the forensic science community.  I believe that 
full and committed cooperation is an ethical obligation. 
 When a forensic examiner gives an opinion that a piece of evidence 
collected during an investigation “matches” or is “indistinguishable” from a 
known source, and a jury relies on that testimony, in whole or in part, in its 
decision to convict, and the conviction is later shown to have been factually 
wrong, the criminal justice system has definitely made an error.  And the 
jury returned a verdict that was wrong.  But has the forensic examiner 
made an error, or is such result merely attributable to the imperfect diag-
nosticity of the forensic discipline involved?  This was the question that I 
noted earlier had been raised in passing in the NAS Report itself.51  It 
sounds almost like a metaphysical question, but it has important real-world 
implications when it comes to determining the responsibility for errors re-
sulting from forensic science testimony.  To a great extent, whether to 
count this as an error of the forensic discipline, or merely an unfortunate 
result of imperfect diagnosticity, depends in large measure on what is 
known about the diagnosticity of the discipline, and what is claimed for it 
explicitly or by implication in front of the jury.52 
 
 50. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bono, President’s Message, ACAD. NEWS (American Academy 
of Forensic Sciences, Colorado Springs, C.O.), May 2010, at 1.  I have heard Mr. Bono and 
others express themselves even more explicitly in this regard in presentations to various 
conferences. 
 51. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
 52. Technically, test diagnosticity is made up of two components.  In the presence of  X, 
how often X is indicated (sensitivity), and when X is indicated, how often is X true (speci-
ficity).  Since we are only considering situations in which X has been called (not cases of X 
where there has been no call), we are technically dealing only with the half of diagnosticity 
properly called specificity, but the word diagnosticity is more intuitively intelligible, so it 
has been used here for that reason.  This is not really inaccurate, since we are dealing with 
an aspect of diagnosticity, just not the whole of it. 
  The word “diagnosticity” has become a common label for the predictive or discrimi-
nating power of tests or other signs. See, e.g., Geeta Menon, Priya Raghubir & Norbert 
Schwarz, Behavioral Frequency Judgments: An Accessibility-Diagnosticity Framework, 22 
J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 212 (1995).  The word has been around a while, but apparently not 
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Forensic scientists at all levels should embrace the notion that testimony 
of imperfect but well-validated diagnosticity is much more helpful to the 
proper ends of the criminal justice system than testimony making unvali-
dated claims of certainty.  The normal way in which ABO blood grouping 
testimony was presented to the jury in a typical case from a couple of dec-
ades ago illustrates clearly how expert testimony of low diagnosticity can 
be presented so as to make clear such relatively low diagnosticity of the in-
formation to the jury.  The jury would have been told that the blood group 
of the defendant indeed “matched” that of the blood found at the scene, but 
the jury would also have been told the approximate statistical incidence of 
that group in the population.  (For instance, if the defendant and the crime 
scene blood were both type O, rh factor negative, then the jury would be 
told that more than a third of the population of the United States [37.4%] 
shares that blood grouping.53)  In such a case, if the jury overvalues the 
evidence, it is difficult to fault the expert information given, the expert who 
testified to it, or the party adducing it, or to call any resulting erroneous 
jury verdict an “error” of the expertise. 
However, if testimony concerning a comparison process (say, bitemarks) 
asserts that the meaning of a match is that the defendant’s teeth were the 
source of the bitemarks on the victim’s skin (thus asserting directly or by 
clear implication perfect individuation, or a zero error rate), when in fact 
the process is much less diagnostic than a reasonable juror would conclude 
from such testimony, then any error resulting from juror reliance on the tes-
 
long enough to garner an entry in the Oxford English Dictionary, or Merriam-Webster’s, or 
any other dictionary that I was able to track down, on-line or off.  One would probably sus-
pect that the word originated in medicine, since physicians are most associated with diagno-
sis, but that turns out to be almost certainly wrong.  A search through the PubMed and 
JSTOR databases indicates that word seems to have first appeared (without explanation) in a 
1959 article on North American prehistory. See Richard S. MacNeish, A Speculative 
Framework of North American Prehistory as of April 1959, 1 ANTHROPOLOGICA 7 (1959).  
Throughout the 1960s it appears mostly in articles on educational psychology. See, e.g., 
Willard E. North & John Schmid, A Comparison of Three Ways of Phrasing Likert Type At-
titude Items, 29 J. EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 95 (1960); Roger W. Shuy, The Relevance of Soci-
olinguistics for Language Teaching, 3 TESOL Q. 13 (1969).  By 1970 it was being used in 
Bayesian decision theory of the sort pioneered by Howard Raiffa. See, e.g., Charles F. Get-
tys, David W. Martin, Leon H. Nawrocki & William C. Howell, Human Evaluation of the 
Diagnosticity of Potential Experiments, 83 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 25 (1970).  In its 
original decision theory meaning, diagnosticity was a measure of the extent to which a piece 
of information supported one hypothesis over a competing hypothesis.  From there, the term 
was taken up more broadly by the measurement and testing literature. 
 53. Of course, there is an “error rate” for the test for blood groups that determines what 
counts as a match.  (Here we would be concerned with false positives).  However, those 
tests are well validated, and the error rates are small.  And of course a false positive can be 
conceptualized not as an “error” but simply a result of the limit of the test’s diagnosticity 
(specificity). 
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timony is properly counted as an error of the forensic discipline (and the 
practitioner).54 
We can see from this that any comparison process can be purged of 
charges of error when testimony of inclusion is given if [and only if] the 
approximate statistical incidence of coincidental matches in some appropri-
ate reference population is known, and communicated clearly to the jury.  
At that point, the diagnosticity of the process is known, and any resulting 
error is on the jury, or on God.  So research into this question (which can 
be done as much through black box testing as through statistical modeling) 
is fundamental to knowing the risk of error in verdicts which is being im-
posed on the system in the absence of such knowledge through explicit or 
implied overclaiming.  And cooperation with such research would seem to 
be both a professional and an ethical obligation of forensic practitioners at 
all levels. 
We would all really like to have processes of diagnosticity approaching 
perfection. When the process said X was true, not X was never the case 
(specificity), and the process declared X in the presence of every X (sensi-
tivity).  We should work to improve diagnosticity for old processes, or to 
 
 54. See Bowers, supra note 24.  For a particularly egregious example, see the perfor-
mance of Dr. L. Thomas Johnson in the case of Robert Lee Stinson, documented in Guilty, 
Said Bite Expert; Bogus, Says DNA, CHI. TRIB., July 10, 2008, http://www.chicagotribune. 
com/news/chi-bite-mark-exonerationjul10,0,2835607.story.  Stinson was finally released in 
January of 2009, and charges were finally dropped in mid-2010. See Charges Dropped in 
Wisconsin Case, INNOCENCE PROJECT BLOG (July 28, 2009, 5:17 PM), http://www. 
innocenceproject.org/Content/Charges_Dropped_in_Wisconsin_Case.php. 
  For results from a recent and ongoing program of research showing that the precon-
ditions of secure identification from bitemarks are rarely present in the real world, see Mary 
A. Bush, Raymond G. Miller, Peter J. Bush & Robert B. J. Dorion, Biomechanical Factors 
in Human Dermal Bitemarks in a Cadaver Model, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 167 (2009); Ray-
mond G. Miller, Peter J. Bush, Robert B. J. Dorion & Mary A. Bush, Uniqueness of the 
Dentition as Impressed in Human Skin: A Cadaver Model, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 909 (2009); 
Mary A. Bush, Kyle Thorsrud, Raymond G. Miller, Robert B. J. Dorion & Peter J. Bush, 
The Response of Skin to Applied Stress: Investigation of Bitemark Distortion in a Cadaver 
Model, 55 J. FORENSIC SCI. 71 (2010); Mary A. Bush, Howard I. Cooper & Robert B. J. Do-
rion, Bitemark Profiling and Arbitrary Distortion Compensation Examined: Inquiry into 
Scientific Basis, 55 J. FORENSIC SCI. 976 (2010); Mary A. Bush, Peter J. Bush & H. David 
Sheets, Statistical Evidence for the Similarity of the Human Dentition, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 
(forthcoming 2011) (on file with author); H. David Sheets, Peter J. Bush, Cynthia Brzo-
zowski, Lillian A. Nawrocki, Phyllis Ho & Mary J. Bush, Dental Shape Match Rates in Se-
lected and Orthodontically Treated Populations in New York State: A Two Dimensional 
Study, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author);  Mary A. Bush, Peter J. 
Bush & H. David Sheets, Similarity and Match Rates of the Human Dentition in Three Di-
mensions: Relevance to Bitemark Analysis, INT’L J. LEGAL MED. (forthcoming 2011) (on file 
with author); H. David Sheets & Mary A. Bush, Mathematical Matching of a Dentition to 
Bitemarks: Use and Evaluation of Affine Methods, FORENSIC SCI. INT’L (forthcoming 2011) 
(on file with author). 
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invent or adopt new ones with improved diagnosticity. But failing that, we 
must do research on (and cooperate with research on) the actual diagnostic-
ity of current process, most of whose diagnosticity in general, and even 
more importantly, as to each subtask, and under the conditions of real prac-
tice is not currently known.  There are potential roadblocks for such re-
search, including failure of forensic practitioner cooperation, failure to un-
dertake a program of research on a sufficiently task-specific level, and the 
possibility that research designed to protect the status quo, faux research, if 
you will, will be allocated the bulk of research money and drown properly 
designed research according to a kind of Gresham’s law.55  A program of 
good research will take a long time to design and conduct, but it must be 
done.  When we have developed the data on the actual diagnosticity of the 
forensic processes we use, the information given to juries about the results 
of those processes may be less apparently probative, but it will then be va-
lid and, in the most important normative senses, error free. 
 
 55. See D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Rationality, Research and Leviathan:  
Law Enforcement Sponsored Research and the Criminal Process, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1023, 1037-50; Risinger, A Glass Nine-Tenths Full, supra note 3, at 21 n.67; Risinger, A 
Path Forward Fraught with Pitfalls, supra note 3, at 239-40.  There is reason to hope that 
the NAS Report has made funding agencies such as the National Institute of Justice more 
careful to select well-designed research for funding. 
